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Abstract
The Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) is arguably the
first implementation of the Belief–Desire–Intention (BDI)
approach to agent programming. PRS remains extremely
influential, directly or indirectly inspiring the development
of subsequent BDI agent programming languages. How-
ever, perhaps surprisingly given its centrality in the BDI
paradigm, PRS lacks a formal operational semantics, mak-
ing it difficult to determine its expressive power relative to
other agent programming languages. This paper takes a first
step towards closing this gap, by giving a formal semantics
for a significant fragment of PRS. We prove key properties
of the semantics relating to PRS-specific programming con-
structs, and show that even the fragment of PRS we consider
is strictly more expressive than the plan constructs found in
typical BDI languages.
1 Introduction
The Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) [7, 9, 8] is gen-
erally recognised as one of the first implementations of
the Belief–Desire–Intention (BDI) [2] model of agency
and practical reasoning. PRS has been extremely influen-
tial, and is still widely used [10], particularly in robotics,
e.g., [13, 1, 6, 16, 14]. For example, PRS-based systems se-
cured first and second places in recent RoboCup and ICAPS
logistics competitions. PRS has also influenced the design
of many subsequent BDI-based agent programming lan-
guages, e.g., [18, 11, 3, 24, 15, 19, 20], though most of these
languages implement only a subset of the programming lan-
guage features supported by PRS. Surprisingly, given its
centrality in the BDI paradigm, PRS lacks a formal oper-
ational semantics, which makes it difficult to determine its
expressive power relative to other BDI agent programming
languages, or to verify the correctness of PRS programs. For
example, there is a widespread “folk belief” in the agent
programming community that the plan graphs used by PRS
are more expressive than most if not all other BDI agent for-
malisations, yet no proof of this intuition exists.
In this paper, we give a formal semantics for a significant
fragment of PRS. We focus on language features specific
to PRS, and in particular, its graph-based representation for
plans and its programming constructs for maintaining a con-
dition (i.e., maintenance goals). We make three main con-
tributions. First, we develop a formalisation for the syntax
of PRS as a directed bipartite graph (Section 2). Second, we
provide an operational semantics that accounts for graph-
based plans and adopting, suspending, resuming, and abort-
ing (nested) maintenance goals (Section 3). Third, we prove
key properties of the semantics of these PRS-specific pro-
gramming constructs, and show that PRS plan-graphs are
strictly more expressive than the plan rules found in typical
BDI languages (Section 4). In Section 5, we briefly discuss
related work and conclude.
2 PRS Syntax
We briefly recall the syntax and deliberation cycle of PRS,
as defined in [12]. In the interests of brevity, we omit some
features of the language, including meta-level reasoning,
‘true concurrency’, semaphores, and features such as ‘if’
and ‘else’ statements expressible in terms of the fragment
we define. Plans in PRS consist of graphs. For compactness,
and to allow a precise specification of the semantics, we
adopt a plan-rule notation similar to that used in other BDI-
based agent programming languages to specify the trigger-
ing and context conditions of plans, and specify plan bod-
ies using a textual representation of bipartite graphs. We
assume a first-order language with a vocabulary consisting
of mutually disjoint and infinite sets of variable, constant,
predicate, node, event-goal, and action symbols.
A PRS agent is defined by a belief base B, an action-
library Λ, and a plan-library Π. A belief base is a set of
ground atoms. An action-library is a set of action-rules
specifying the actions available to the agent. An action is
of the form act(~t), where act is an n-ary action symbol de-
noting an evaluable function that may change the agent’s en-
vironment, and ~t = t1, . . . , tn are (possibly ground) terms.
Action-rules are similar to STRIPS operators, and are of
the form act(~v):ψ ← Φ+; Φ−, where ~v = v1, . . . , vn are
variables; ψ is a formula specifying the precondition of the
action; and the add-list Φ+ and delete-list Φ− are sets of
atoms that specify the effects of executing the action. A
plan-library Π consists of a set of plan-rules of the form
e(~t):ϕ ;ψ ← G, where e is an n-ary event-goal symbol,
~t = t1, . . . , tn are terms, ϕ and ψ are formulas, and G is
a plan-body graph. The rule states that, if the context con-
dition ψ holds, G is a ‘standard operating procedure’ for
achieving the event-goal e(~t) or the goal-condition ϕ.
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Plan-body graphs are built from the following set of user
programs: actions; belief addition +b adds the atom b to
B; belief removal −b removes the atom b from B; test ?φ,
where φ is a formula, tests whether φ holds in B; event-goal
program or goal-condition program !ev, where ev ∈ {e, φ},
specifies that ev needs to be achieved; wait WT(φ) waits un-
til formula φ holds in B; passive preserve PRp(!ev, φ) spec-
ifies that !ev needs to be achieved while monitoring φ and
aborted if ev fails or φ does not hold; and active preserve
PRa(!ev, φ), which is similar to the former except that if con-
dition φ does not hold, the plan-body graph for !ev is sus-
pended and the re-achievement of φ is attempted by posting
the goal !φ. If the goal succeeds and φ is re-achieved then
the active preserve is resumed, and otherwise it is aborted
(if the goal fails) or re-suspended (if the goal succeeds but
φ is still not achieved). Since user program !ev may gen-
erate subgoals, wait and preserve programs may also be-
come ‘nested’ within one another, giving rise to potentially
complex interactions. We use PRx(!ev, φ) to denote either
PRa(!ev, φ) or PRp(!ev, φ). Formally, a user program Pu is
a formula in the language defined by the grammar
Pu ::= act | ?φ | +b | −b | !ev | WT(φ) | PRx(!ev, φ).
A plan-body graph is a directed bipartite graph represent-
ing a partially ordered set of user programs, where the set
of nodes (i.e., node symbols) is split into state nodes, and
transition nodes initially labelled with the user programs.
Definition 1. Let Pu be the set of all user programs. A
plan-body graph G is a tuple 〈S ,T ,Ein ,Eout ,L0 ,N , s0 〉,
where: (i) S is a set of state nodes and s0 ∈ S the ini-
tial node; (ii) T is a disjoint set of transition nodes; (iii)
Ein ⊆ S × T is a set of input edges; (iv) Eout ⊆ T × S
is a set of output edges; (v) function L0 : T 7→ Pu repre-
sents the user programs labelling transition nodes; and (vi)
N ⊆ S ∪ T is a set of current nodes.
We stipulate that for any node n ∈ S ∪ T there exists a
sequence s1 ·t1 ·. . .·sk−1 ·tk−1 ·sk, such that s0 = s1, node n
is in the sequence, and for each i ∈ [1, k−1] : (si, ti) ∈ Ein
and (ti, si+1) ∈ Eout.
The PRS deliberation cycle consists of three main steps:
processing environment updates, e.g., new event-goals or
belief updates; instantiating a plan-body graph to achieve
an event-goal or goal condition, or executing a single step
in an instantiated plan-body graph; and notifying plan-body
graphs when conditions they are monitoring are established
or violated. Execution of a plan-body graph starts in the
initial node (s0), and progresses to one or more state/tran-
sition nodes (N ). Transition nodes initially represent user
programs (L0) and evolve following the semantics in Sec-
tion 3 until they reach the ‘empty program’ and terminate.
The plan-body graph finishes executing (successfully) if no
current state nodes N of G lead anywhere. Formally, the
plan-body graph is initial if N = {s0}, and finished, de-
noted by fin(G), if N ⊆ S, and for all s ∈ N and t ∈ T :
(s, t) 6∈ Ein. All plan-body graphs occurring in a plan-
library are initial.
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Figure 1: Plan-body graphs Gwalk and Gpw. Gpw occurs in a
plan-rule for the event-goal program !pw (prepare to walk) in
Gwalk.
Example 1. Consider an agent that has a goal to travel from
its current location to a destination d [20]. The goal can be
achieved in various ways depending on the distance to the
destination, represented by the following plan-rules (each
omitted goal-condition ϕ is >):
travel(d) : At(x) ∧WalkDist(x, d)← Gwalk ,
travel(d) : At(x) ∧ ∃y(InCity(x, y) ∧ InCity(d, y))← Gcity ,
travel(d) : At(x) ∧ ¬∃y(InCity(x, y) ∧ InCity(d, y))← Gfar .
The first plan-rule refers to the plan-body graph Gwalk
shown in Fig. 1.
3 PRS Semantics
Our semantics for PRS follows the approach adopted by the
CAN [24] agent programming language, as defined in [20],
where a transition relation on agent configurations is de-
fined in terms of a set of derivation rules [17]. An agent
configuration is a tuple [Π ,Λ,B,A,Γ ] where Π is a plan-
library, Λ is an action-library, B is a belief base, A is a se-
quence of executed actions, and Γ is a set of intentions (as Π
and Λ do not change during execution, we omit them from
derivation rules). Agent configurations represent the execu-
tion state of a PRS agent, and intentions are the current states
of full programs being pursued in order to achieve top-level
event-goals. As in CAN, full programs extend the syntax
of user programs to represent the current evolution of a user
program, and may contain information used to decide the
next transition, e.g. the plan-body graphs yet to be tried in
achieving an event-goal.
Formally, a full program (or simply program) is a formula
in the language defined by the grammar P ::=
η | act | ?φ | +b | −b | !ev | WTx(φ) | PRx(P, φ) |
ev : L{ψ1 : G1, . . . , ψn : Gn}M | P  P ′ | G . P | η . P
where η, (‘nil’) indicates that there is nothing left to execute;
WTx(φ) denotes either WT(φ) or WT(φ), where WT(φ) in-
dicates that program WT(φ) has been adopted (i.e., its exe-
cution has started); ev : Lψ1 : G1, . . . , ψn : GnM represents
the set of relevant plan-rules for achieving the event-goal
or goal-condition ev; P  P ′ represents a suspended ac-
tive preserve program P ′ whose associated condition is be-
ing re-achieved by a recovery program P ; G . P , where
P = ev : Lψ1 : G1, . . . , ψn : GnM, represents the default
deliberation mechanism for ‘goal commitment’: achieve ev
using an applicable plan-body graph G, but if that fails, try
an alternative applicable graph from those appearing in P ;
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[B,A,+b]→ [B ∪ {b},A, η] add [B,A,−b]→ [B \ {b},A, η] del
act′ : ψ ← Φ+; Φ− ∈ Λ act′θ = act B |= ψθ
[B,A, act ]→ [(B \ Φ−θ) ∪ Φ+θ,A · act , η] A
[B,A,G]→ [B′,A′,G ′]
[B,A,G B P ]→ [B′,A′,G ′ B P ] Bstp [B,A, η B P ]→ [B,A, η] Bend
¬fin(G) [B,A,G] 6→ [B,A,P ]→ [B′,A′,P ′]
[B,A,G B P ]→ [B′,A′,P ′] Bf
Figure 2: PRS derivation rules for actions, belief updates, and goal commitment.
and η . P indicates that a plan-body graph for ev has suc-
ceeded. Note that full programs are more general than those
yielded by our semantics.
We first give derivation rules for configurations of the
form [Π ,Λ,B,A,P ], where P is a full program, i.e., for a
single intention. We give the derivation rules for actions,
belief operations, goal and plan adoption, and goal com-
mitment in Section 3.1; for advancing plan-body graphs in
Section 3.2; for PRS-specific wait and preserve programs in
Section 3.3; and for agents with configurations of the form
[Π ,Λ,B,A,Γ ], i.e., multiple intentions, in Section 3.4.
3.1 Semantics for Actions, Belief Updates, Goal
and Plan Adoption, and Goal Commitment
Fig. 2 shows the derivation rules for actions and belief op-
erations. Rules add and del simply update B, replacing
programs +b and −b with η (A remains unchanged). The
semantics for actions is given by rule A. The antecedent
checks whether there is a relevant action-rule for act (i.e.,
one whose ‘head’ act′ matches act under substitution θ),
and whether the action is applicable (i.e., its precondition
holds in B); the conclusion of the derivation rule applies the
action’s add- and delete-lists to B and appends the action to
A.
Rule Ev1 adopts the event-goal program !e by creating
the set ∆ of plan-rules relevant for the event, i.e, the rules
in Π with event-goals matching e via a most general unifier
mgu.
∆ = {ψθ : Gθ | e′ : ϕ ;ψ ← G ∈ Π, θ = mgu(e, e′)} 6= ∅
[B,A, !e]→ [B,A, e : L∆M] Ev1
Example 2. Processing an event-goal program of the form
!travel(Uni) using rule Ev1 yields the following (full) pro-
gram, encoding all relevant options for this event:
travel(Uni) : Lψ1 : Gwalk, ψ2 : Gcity, ψ3 : GfarM
with ψ1 = At(x) ∧WalkDist(x, Uni);
ψ2 = At(x) ∧ ∃y(InCity(x, y) ∧ InCity(Uni, y)); and
ψ3 = At(x) ∧ ¬∃y(InCity(x, y) ∧ InCity(Uni, y)).
Similarly, rule Ev2 adopts the goal-condition program !φ
by creating the set ∆ of plan-rules in Π that can achieve φ.
∆ = {ψθ : Gθ | e : ϕ ;ψ ← G ∈ Π, ϕθ |= φ} 6= ∅
[B,A, !φ]→ [B,A, φ : L∆M] Ev2
Rule Sel selects an applicable plan-rule for event-goal or
goal-condition ev from the set of relevant rules, and sched-
ules the associated plan-body graph for execution.
ψ : G ∈ ∆ B |= ψθ
[B,A, ev : L∆M]→ [B,A,Gθ B ev : L∆ \ {ψ : G}M] Sel
Rules for goal commitment are shown in Fig. 2. Rule
Bstp executes a single step in a program GB P if the plan-
body graph G has neither failed nor finished (see Section
3.2). RuleBend discards the alternative program P in a pro-
gram η B P (where η here represents a completed graph).
Finally, rule Bf schedules the alternative P = ev : L∆M for
execution and executes a single step in it, provided G has
failed and P has not, i.e., an applicable plan-rule exists for
ev.
3.2 Semantics for Plan-Body Graphs
We extend the definition of a plan-body graph in Def-
inition 1 to a full plan-body graph, representing the
current ‘state’ in the evolution of an initial plan-body
graph. A full plan-body graph is of the form G =
〈S ,T ,Ein ,Eout ,L0 ,Lc ,N , s0 〉 where Lc : T 7→ P is a
function that maps each transition node t ∈ T to a full pro-
gram P ∈ P, which represents the current form of the possi-
bly evolved (initial) user program L0(t). We use the follow-
ing auxiliary definitions: bef (t) = {s | (s, t) ∈ Ein} are
the input state nodes of t; aft(t) = {s | (t, s) ∈ Eout} are
its output state nodes; and the update to function Lc with a
(new) program P for t is
UPD(Lc, t, P ) =
(
Lc \ {〈t ,Lc(t)〉}
) ∪ {〈t ,P〉}.1
The first rule states that a transition node t, in the case
where it is not initially associated with a test condition, be-
comes active if it is not already active but all of its input
states are. Becoming active includes (re-)initialising t to
correspond to its user program. This is done in case t is
part of a cycle.
t ∈ T t 6∈ N bef (t) ⊆ N L0(t) 6=?φ
[B,A,G]→ [B,A,G ′] G
P
start
where G′ = 〈S ,T ,Ein ,Eout ,L0 ,L′c ,N ′, s0 〉;
L′c = UPD(Lc, t, L0(t)); N
′ =
(
N \ bef (t)) ∪ {t}.
Once a transition node t is active, it can perform a single
execution step in its associated (current) program Lc(t).
t ∈ N [B,A,Lc(t)]→ [B′,A′,P ]
[B,A,G]→ [B′,A′,G ′] G
P
stp
G′ = 〈S ,T ,Ein ,Eout ,L0 ,L′c ,N , s0 〉; L′c = UPD(Lc, t, P ).
If a transition node’s program has finished execution, the
node becomes inactive and its outgoing nodes become ac-
tive.
t ∈ N Lc(t) = η
[B,A,G]→ [B,A,G ′] G
P
end
G′ = 〈S ,T ,Ein ,Eout ,L0 ,Lc ,N ′, s0 〉;N ′ = (N \ {t}) ∪ aft(t).
1We treat the functions L0 and Lc as relations, i.e., as sets of ordered
pairs of the form 〈t ,P〉.
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Example 3. Suppose that the agent believes it is currently
at home, which is walking distance to the university. In
this case, the Sel rule transforms the set of relevant op-
tions represented by the program in Example 2 into the pro-
gram Gwalk B travel(Uni) : Lψ2 : Gcity, ψ3 : GfarM, i.e.,
the agent selects the Gwalk plan-body graph while keeping
the other graphs as backup alternatives, represented by the
right-hand side of the B operator. When the agent starts ex-
ecuting the Gwalk graph, the rule GPstart removes s0 from N
and adds the transition node associated with subgoal !pw.
This is then executed using ruleGPstp, whose antecedent uses
rule Ev1 to resolve the subgoal.
If a transition node is initially associated with a test con-
dition, then the node becomes active only if the condition
holds in the current belief base. The chosen transition node
also becomes inactive at the same execution step, as once
the condition is tested there is nothing left to execute. Un-
der this semantics, PRS allows choices in execution within
the graph: either a non-deterministic choice when multiple
transition nodes, with non ‘mutex’ test programs, exit the
same state node, or deterministic choices induced by such
tests.
t ∈ T bef (t) ⊆ N L0(t) =?φ B |= φ
[B,A,G]→ [B,A,G ′] G
?φ
stp
G′ = 〈S ,T ,Ein ,Eout ,L0 ,L′c ,N ′, s0 〉;
L′c = UPD(Lc, t, η); N
′ =
(
N \ bef (t)) ∪ aft(t).
The case where B 6|= φ holds represents failure, i.e., the
inability to execute a step in t.
Finally, if a plan-body graph has finished (Section 2), rule
Gend replaces it with program η.
fin(G)
[B,A,G]→ [B,A, η] Gend
Example 4. Consider the evolution Gpw B pw : L∆pwM of
subgoal !pw. Achieving the former using the graph in Fig-
ure 1 involves the parallel execution of the programs P 1pw
and P 2pw. This ‘split’ is represented by the outgoing edges
from the transition node associated with the ?> user pro-
gram, and results in state nodes s4 and s5 being added toN ,
using ruleG?φstp. Note that for the transition node associated
with !ev2 to become active, both P 1pw and P
2
pw must com-
plete execution, and transition to s6 and s7, respectively.
3.3 Semantics for Wait and Preserve Programs
We now give a semantics for wait and preserve programs of
the form WT(φ), PRp(P, φ), and PRa(P, φ), and suspended
active preserve programs of the form P1  PRa(P2, φ),
where P1 is the recovery program. In all cases, we assume
that condition φ is ground when the program is adopted.
Rule Wadopt adopts a wait program, i.e., changes its
form to indicate that condition φ is now being monitored.
Rule W specifies that the wait for φ should continue if φ
does not hold in the belief base. Finally, rule Wend spec-
ifies that the wait should end if φ does hold. In all cases,
C = [B,A,WT(φ)].
[B,A,WT(φ)]→ C Wadopt
B 6|= φ
C → C W
B |= φ
C → [B,A, η] Wend
The first set of derivation rules for preserve programs apply
to both passive and active preserves. Rule Pradopt specifies
the adoption of a preserve program, i.e., the adoption of its
event-goal or goal-condition program !ev. Rule Prstp exe-
cutes a single step in a preserve program if φ is not violated,
and Prsucc removes a completed preserve program.
[B,A, !ev]→ [B,A, ev : L∆M]
[B,A, PRx (!ev, φ)]→ [B,A, PRx (ev : L∆M, φ)] Pradopt
P 6=!ev B |= φ [B,A,P ]→ [B′,A′,P ′]
[B,A, PRx (P , φ)]→ [B′,A′, PRx (P ′, φ)]
Prstp
[B,A, PRx (η, φ)]→ [B,A, η] Prsucc
Rule Prfail specifies that the passive preserve fails if φ is
violated or P is blocked.
P 6∈ {η, !ev} (B 6|= φ ∨ [B,A,P ] 6→ )
[B,A, PRp(P , φ)]→ [B,A, ?false] Prfail
Rules APrfail to APr
stp2
sus operationalise adopted active and
suspended preserve programs. We define three special mul-
tisets.2 Given an expression E that is either a program
or plan-body graph G = 〈S, T,Ein, Eout, L0, Lc, N, s0〉,
we define a ‘path’ of ‘nested’ (adopted) preserve and wait
programs as any element in the multiset T (E), defined as
T (E) =
{E · τ | τ ∈ T (Pˆ )} if E = P  PRa(Pˆ , φ) ∧ P 6= GB P1;
{E · τ | τ ∈ T (Pˆ )}
unionmulti T (G) if E = (GB P ) PRa(Pˆ , φ);
{E · τ | τ ∈ T (G)} if E = PRx(GB P, φ);
{E} if E ∈ {WT(φ), PRx(ev : L∆M, φ)};
T (G) if E = GB P ;
T (Lc(t1))
unionmulti . . . unionmulti T (Lc(tn)) if E = G and N ∩ T = {t1, . . . , tn};
∅ otherwise.
When E = G we take the multiset union of the sequences
corresponding to transition nodes in G that are executed in
parallel. The first element in such a sequence is a ‘most
abstract’ preserve or wait program occurring in E , and the
last element is a ‘most deeply’ nested preserve or wait pro-
gram occurring in E . We use Sτ (E) and Pτ (E) to denote the
multisets of all the elements in all the sequences in T (E)
that are, and are not, of the form P  P ′, respectively;
i.e., any element in Sτ (E) is a suspended (adopted) active
preserve program, and any element in Pτ (E) is an adopted
wait, passive preserve, or active preserve program that is not
suspended. We use T (E) to check whether a wait/preserve
program in some ‘path’ in E may be ‘pruned’ by a more ab-
stract preserve program in the path, and we use Sτ (E) and
Pτ (E) to count the number of suspended and unsuspended
programs occurring in E .
Example 5. Suppose P 1pw and P 2pw have evolved to, re-
spectively, adopted programs WT(φ) and PRp(P, φ′), with
2Adapted from [20].
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C1
INT
=⇒ C2 C2 EVENT=⇒ C3 C3 COND∗=⇒ C4 C4 6COND=⇒
C1
PRS
=⇒ C4
Aprs
P ∈ Γ [B,A,P ]→ [B′,A′,P ′]
C INT=⇒ [B′,A′, (Γ \ {P}) ∪ {P ′}]
Aint
P ∈ Γ [B,A,P ] 6→
C INT=⇒ [B,A,Γ \ {P}]
Arem
e1, . . . , en are external event-goals
C EVENT=⇒ [B,A,Γ ∪ Γ ′]
Aev
P ∈ Γ [B,A,P ]→ [B,A,P ′] P ′ ≺ P
C COND=⇒ [B,A, (Γ \ {P}) ∪ {P ′}]
Acond
Figure 3: Agent-level derivation rules; each Ci is an agent configuration, C = [B,A,Γ ], and Γ′ = {!e1, . . . , !en}.
P = e : L∆M (i.e., one parallel branch waits for a con-
dition φ while the other tries to achieve an event-goal
program !e while preserving φ′). Then, T (Gwalk) =
{WT(φ), PRp(P, φ′)}. Moreover, if P evolves to P ′ =
GeBe : L∆′M, whereGe mentions an adopted program, e.g.,
WT(φ′′), then T (Gwalk) = {WT(φ), PRp(P ′, φ′) ·WT(φ′′)}.
Rule APrfail specifies that the adopted active preserve
program PRa(P, φ) fails if P fails and the monitored condi-
tion φ is not violated. If φ is violated, APrsus suspends the
preserve program and attempts to re-establish φ using the
recovery (goal-condition) program !φ. Rules APrfailsus and
APrunsus specify, respectively, that a suspended preserve
program fails if the recovery program fails, and is resumed
if the recovery program completes.
P 6∈ {η, !ev} B |= φ [B,A,P ] 6→
[B,A, PRa(P , φ)]→ [B,A, ?false] APrfail
P 6∈ {η, !ev} B 6|= φ
[B,A, PRa(P , φ)]→ [B,A, !φ PRa(P , φ)] APrsus
P1 6= η [B,A,P1 ] 6→
[B,A,P1  P2 ]→ [B,A, ?false] APr
fail
sus
[B,A, η  PRa(P , φ)]→ [B,A, PRa(P , φ)] APrunsus
Finally, rules APrstp1sus and APr
stp2
sus define the execution
of recovery programs and suspended (active preserve) pro-
grams. Rule APrstp2sus executes a single ‘cleanup’ or ‘no-
tification’ step in the suspended program. Such an exe-
cution step amounts to a program P1 evolving to a pro-
gram P2 that has fewer suspended programs, or fewer un-
suspended preserve or wait programs, e.g. due to a failed
passive preserve that had a ‘nested’ wait program. The
relation P ≺ P ′ is defined for programs P and P ′ as:
P ≺ P ′ def= |Pτ (P )| < |Pτ (P ′)| ∨ |Sτ (P )| < |Sτ (P ′)|.
[B,A,P1 ]→ [B′,A′,P ′1 ]
[B,A,P1  P2 ]→ [B′,A′,P ′1  P2 ] APr
stp1
sus
[B,A,P2 ]→ [B,A,P ′2 ] P ′2 ≺ P2
[B,A,P1  PRa(P2 , φ)]→ [B,A,P1  PRa(P ′2 , φ)] APr
stp2
sus
Note that ruleAPrstp2sus implies that if an active preserve is
suspended, all of the (possibly adopted) ‘nested’ programs
occurring in P2 are ‘implicitly suspended’, i.e., they can
only perform ‘cleanup’ or ‘notification’ steps, so we are
guaranteed to terminate.
Proposition 1. Any sequence of configurations
[B1 ,A1 ,P1 ] · . . . · [Bn ,An ,Pn ] is finite if for all
i ∈ [1, n − 1], we have that Pi+1 ≺ Pi and
[Bi ,Ai ,Pi ]→ [Bi+1 ,Ai+1 ,Pi+1 ].
Proof. Since each such execution step from Pi to Pi+1 must
yield fewer wait programs, preserve programs, and/or pro-
grams of the form P  PRa(P ′, φ), it is sufficient to con-
sider whether a ‘switch’ of the latter to resume PRa(P ′, φ)
can lead to it (possibly with an ‘evolved’ P ′) being sus-
pended again, and whether this can continue indefinitely.
For PRa(P ′, φ) to resume, we must have P = η, and then
if φ still does not hold, the program will indeed evolve to
!φ  PRa(P ′, φ). Moreover, recovery program !φ does
have at least one relevant plan-rule, as it was once able to
evolve to η (recall that φ has been ground from the moment
its associated active preserve program was adopted). How-
ever, the only possible execution step on !φ cannot reduce
the number of aforementioned programs.
We use the notation C C ′ to denote that there exists a
non-empty sequence of configurations from C to C ′.
3.4 Agent-Level (‘Top-Level’) Semantics
We now give the derivation rules for the top-level execu-
tion of an agent program. Transitions between agent con-
figurations are defined by the derivation rules in Fig. 3;
an expression C t=⇒ C′ denotes a transition of type t ∈
{PRS, EVENT, COND, INT}.
Rule Aprs is the top-level rule, and represents the PRS
deliberation cycle. A single PRS type execution step com-
prises three things: progressing an intention by one step, or
removing a completed intention (i.e., P = η) or a failed one
(using rules Aint or Arem, respectively); processing newly
observed event-goals (using rule Aev), i.e., creating an in-
tention for each new event-goal that is observed from the
(external) environment; and finally, performing all the nec-
essary ‘notification’ and ‘cleanup’ steps on wait, preserve,
suspended, and recovery programs (using rule Acond) to
leave the agent in a ‘sound’ or ‘stable’ configuration. More
specifically, Acond takes a single step in an intention if the
step will yield an intention with fewer suspended programs,
or fewer unsuspended (adopted) preserve or wait programs.
4 Properties of the Semantics
We now prove key properties of the semantics and show the
greater expressivity of our PRS fragment compared to CAN.
In what follows, we use [B,A,P ] → as an abbreviation for
∃B′,A′, P ′ : [B,A,P ]→ [B′,A′,P ′], and C1, C2 are agent
configurations of the form [Bi ,Ai ,Γi ] such that C1 is sound
and C1
PRS
=⇒ C2. A configuration C = [Λ,Π ,B,A,Γ ] is
sound iff (i) for all WT(φ) ∈ Pτ (Γ), B 6|= φ; (ii) for all P  
P ′ ∈ Sτ (Γ), [B,A,P ] →; and (iii) for all PRx(P, φ) ∈
Pτ (Γ), B |= φ and [B,A,P ]→.
Theorem 1 states that all configurations resulting from ap-
plying rule Aprs on a sound configuration are sound.
Theorem 1. Let C1 and C2 be as above. Then, C2 is sound.
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Proof Sketch. Observe from the antecedent of derivation
rule Aprs that only one step of type INT is performed on
C1, followed by one of type EVENT, and zero or more of
type COND. Assume the theorem does not hold because
there is a passive preserve PRp(P, φ) ∈ Pτ (Γ2), for some
P , such that B2 6|= φ or [B2 ,A2 ,P ] 6→. Then, since
PRp(P, φ) is an adopted program appearing in some inten-
tion PI ∈ Γ2, either rule Prfail or Prsucc can be applied
to configuration [B2 ,A2 , PRp(P , φ)] to yield an intention
P ′I . Since P
′
I ≺ PI , rule Acond will be applied (possibly
multiple times) to PI until PRp(P ′, φ) 6∈ Pτ (Γ2) for all
P ′, which contradicts our assumption. Assume instead
that the theorem does not hold because there is a program
P  P ′ ∈ Sτ (Γ2) such that [B2 ,A2 ,P ] 6→. Then, either
rule APrfailsus or APrunsus will be applied to configuration
[B2 ,A2 ,P  P ′] or its ‘evolution’, again resulting in a
contradiction. The remaining cases are proved similarly. 
The next theorem states that an adopted wait program is
only removed in a PRS step if either its condition becomes
satisfied, or the program is pruned, i.e., it is a descendant
of an adopted preserve or a suspended preserve that is dis-
carded. Given a program P and ‘path’ τ ∈ T (P ), we denote
the program at index n > 0 as τ [n] (where τ [1] is τ ’s most
abstract program). A program P is pruned between C1 and
C2 iff for any τ ∈ T (Γ1) with T (Γ) =
⊎
P ′∈Γ T (P ′) and
τ [k] = P for some k > 0, there exists a 0 < j < k such
that:3
1. τ [j] = PRp(Pj , φj) and B2 6|= φj ;
2. τ [j] = PRa(Pj , φj), B2 6|= φj , and [B2 ,A2 , !φj ] 6→; or
3. τ [j] = P1  P2 and either
[B2 ,A2 ,P1 ] [B2 ,A2 ,P ′1 ] 6→, or
[B1 ,A1 ,P1 ]→ [B2 ,A2 ,P ′1 ] [B2 ,A2 ,P ′′1 6= η] 6→.
Theorem 2. Let C1 and C2 be as before. For each WT(φ) ∈
Pτ (Γ1) such that WT(φ) 6∈ Pτ (Γ2), we have that B2 |= φ,
or WT(φ) is pruned between C1 and C2.
Proof Sketch. Let WT(φ) ∈ Pτ (Γ1) be a program such
that WT(φ) 6∈ Pτ (Γ2). Let t be a transition node currently
labelled with WT(φ), where T = {t, . . .} and N = {t, . . .}
are the transition nodes and current nodes in a (‘partially
executed’) plan-body graph G. We consider the case where
if B2 6|= φ, then WT(φ) must have been pruned between
C1 and C2, because no other derivation rules can ‘remove’
WT(φ). First, rule Gend (which, if applicable, ‘removes’
G) requires fin(G) to hold, which cannot be the case as
t ∈ N ; for the same reason, rule GPstart cannot ‘reset’
WT(φ). Second, the antecedent of rule Bf requires that
[B,A,G ] 6→ (for someA and B ∈ {B1,B2}), which cannot
hold as we can take a step on WT(φ) via rule W . Similarly,
if P is an intention in which G occurs, the antecedent
of agent-level rule Arem cannot hold (i.e., [B1 ,A,P ] 6→
3The definitions of Pτ (E) and Sτ (E), for some expression E , can be
generalised similarly.
cannot hold for any A). Then, it follows that WT(φ) is
pruned between C1 and C2. 
Theorem 3 states that an adopted preserve program is
only ‘removed’ if: its condition becomes violated; its asso-
ciated program becomes blocked; or the preserve program
is pruned.
Theorem 3. If C1 and C2 are as before, and PRx(P, φ) ∈
Pτ (Γ1) is a program s.t. PRx(P2, φ) 6∈ Pτ (Γ2) for any P2:
1. B2 6|= φ or [B2 ,A2 ,P ] [B2 ,A2 ,P ′] 6→;
2. [B1 ,A1 ,P ]→ [B2 ,A2 ,P ′] [B3 ,A3 ,P ′′] 6→; or
3. PRx(P, φ) is pruned between C1 and C2.
Proof Sketch. We show that if two of the conditions above
do not hold, then the third will. For example, if (2) and (3)
do not hold, then PRx(P, φ) must have been ‘removed’ by
rule Prfail or suspended by APrsus, whose antecedents
entail (1). Similarly, if (1) and (2) do not hold, then
PRx(P, φ) must have been pruned between C1 and C2 for
the reasons given in the proof of Theorem 2. 
Theorem 4 states that a suspended preserve program is
only ‘removed’ during a PRS step if: the recovery pro-
gram completes and the preserve program’s condition is re-
established; the recovery program becomes blocked; or both
are pruned.
Theorem 4. If C1 and C2 are as before, and P1  
PRa(P2, φ) ∈ Sτ (Γ1) is a program s.t. P  PRa(P ′, φ) 6∈
Sτ (Γ2) for any P and P ′:
1. [B1 ,A1 ,P1 ]→ [B1 ,A1 , η] and B1 |= φ;
2. [B2 ,A2 ,P1 ] [B2 ,A2 ,P ′1 ] 6→;
3. [B1 ,A1 ,P1 ]→ [B2 ,A2 ,P ′1 ] [B3 ,A3 ,P ′′1 6= η] 6→;
4. or P1  PRa(P2, φ) is pruned between C1 and C2.
The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to that of Theorem 3.
Theorems 3 and 4 considered the case where all occur-
rences of preserve programs associated with the same con-
dition φ, e.g. in multiple intentions in Γ1, are removed
in a PRS step. There is also the case where only some of
them are removed in such a step. It is not difficult to de-
velop theorems for this case, though we would need ad-
ditional formal machinery. Similarly, we can show that
active preserve programs are suspended and resumed for
the right reasons. For example, with a minor extension to
Theorem 3, we can show that if PRa(P, φ) becomes sus-
pended (i.e., !φ  PRa(P, φ) ∈ Sτ (Γ2)), then B2 6|= φ and
[B2 ,A2 , !φ]→ hold.
In the remainder of this section, we characterise the rel-
ative expressivity of our PRS fragment and the CAN for-
malism as defined in [20]. A CAN plan-rule is of the form
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e : ψ ← P , where e is an event-goal, ψ is a context condi-
tion, and P is a plan-body, i.e., a formula in the language
defined by the grammar P ::=
act | ?φ | +b | −b | !e | P1;P2 | P1 ‖ P2 | Goal(φs, P ′, φf ),
where P1;P2 is sequential composition, P1 ‖ P2 is paral-
lel composition, and Goal(φs, P ′, φf ) is a declarative goal
specifying that formula φs (the goal) should be achieved us-
ing program P ′, failing if φf becomes true. The remaining
programs are defined as for PRS user programs.
To state our results, we need the notions of execution
traces and solutions. We define these only for PRS as the
definitions for CAN are analogous.
Definition 2. An execution trace of an agent configuration
C = [Λ,Π ,B,A,Γ ] is a finite sequence of agent configura-
tions C1 · . . . ·Cn such that C = C1 and Ci PRS=⇒ Ci+1 for all
i ∈ [1, n− 1]; the solution in C1 · . . . ·Cn is the sequenceA
of actions such that An = A1 · A.
With Λ,Π,B, and Γ as above, SOL(Λ,Π,B,Γ) denotes
the set of solutions, i.e., the set of sequences of ac-
tions performed in the execution traces of configuration
[Λ,Π ,B, ,Γ ], where  denotes the empty string. The-
orem 5 states that a CAN plan-library Π−c not mention-
ing Goal(φs, P, φf ) programs (as there is no corresponding
program in PRS) can be translated into an equivalent PRS
plan-library.
Theorem 5. If Π−c is a CAN library and Λ an action-library,
there exists a PRS library Πp s.t. for any event-goal !e and
beliefs B: SOL(Λ,Π−c ,B, {!e}) = SOL(Λ,Πp,B, {!e}).
Proof Sketch. Given a CAN plan-rule e : ψ ← P ∈ Π−c ,
the first step is to obtain the corresponding PRS plan-
rule e : >;ψ ← G. We define three functions: g(P, n)in,
g(P, n)out, and g(P, n)L, where n ∈ N. When n = 1, these
functions represent respectively the elementsEin, Eout, and
L0 in G. If P = act, we define g(P, n)in = {(n · s, n · t)};
g(P, n)out = {(n · t, n · s′)}; and g(P, n)L = {〈n · t ,P〉},
where s, s′ and t are unique symbols (and thus, n · t, for ex-
ample, is a string). We also define g(P, n)start = n · s and
g(P, n)end = n·s′. Intuitively, n uniquely identifies the PRS
plan-body ‘subgraph’ corresponding to P . If P = P1;P2 is
the sequential composition of CAN programs P1 and P2,
g(P, n)out =
g(P1, n · 1)out ∪ g(P2, n · 2)out ∪ {(n · t′′, n · s′′),
(n · t, g(P1, n · 1)start), (n · t′, g(P2, n · 2)start)};
g(P, n)in =
g(P1, n · 1)in ∪ g(P2, n · 2)in ∪ {(n · s, n · t),(
g(P1, n · 1)end, n · t′
)
,
(
g(P2, n · 2)end, n · t′′
)};
g(P, n)L = g(P1, n · 1)L ∪ g(P2, n · 2)L ∪
{〈n · t , ?>〉, 〈n · t ′, ?>〉, 〈n · t ′′, ?>〉},
where transition node n · t′ ‘connects’ the subgraphs corre-
sponding to P1 and P2. As before, we define g(P, n)start =
n·s and g(P, n)end = n·s′′, and s, s′′, t, t′ and t′′ are unique
symbols. We similarly define the subgraph corresponding to
a CAN parallel composition P1||P2, test program, etc.
We then show by induction on the structures of P
and G above that their traces yield the same solutions.
For example, the derivation rules for CAN’s sequential
composition can be simulated by repeatedly applying the
GPstart, G
P
stp and G
P
end rules of PRS, and vice versa. 
Theorem 6 states that the converse does not hold: even if
we ignore programs that have no counterparts in CAN, PRS
plan-libraries cannot be ‘directly mapped’ to CAN libraries.
This result follows from a similar one in [5] which showed
that the ‘plan-body’ representation used in HTN planning
allows a more fine-grained interleaving of steps than do
CAN plan-bodies: a CAN plan-body must specify steps in
a ‘series-parallel’ manner, whereas HTN ‘plan-bodies’ (and
PRS plan-body graphs) do not.
In what follows, Π−p denotes PRS plan-libraries that do
not mention goal-condition, wait, nor preserve programs,
and Πc ∈ CAN(Π−p ) denotes a directly mapped CAN library,
i.e., one obtained from Π−p by ignoring the goal-condition
ϕ in each plan-rule, and replacing each graph G appearing
in Π−p with a CAN plan-body P such that the multisets of
(user) programs occurring in G and P are the same.
Theorem 6. There exists a PRS library Π−p , an action-
library Λ, and event-goal !e, s.t. for any CAN library
Πc ∈ CAN(Π−p ) and beliefs B: SOL(Λ,Π−p ,B, {!e}) 6=
SOL(Λ,Πc,B, {!e}).
Proof Sketch. We translate an example HTN ‘plan-body’
provided in [5] into a PRS plan-body graph. First, we create
the PRS plan-rule etop : >;> ← G, in particular by taking
the following input and output edges for G:
Ein = {(s1, t1), (s2, t2), (s3, t3), (s4, t4),
(s5, t4), (s6, t5), (s7, t6), (s8, t6)}; and
Eout = {(t1, s2), (t1, s3), (t2, s4), (t3, s5),
(t3, s6), (t4, s7), (t5, s8), (t6, s9)}.
Second, we set the initial program L0(ti) for each ti ∈
{t1, . . . , t6} to a different event-goal eti , each of which is
associated with a single plan-body graph representing the
sequence of unique actions a1ti · a2ti . Finally, we show that
the following sequence of actions:
a1t1 · a2t1 · a1t2 · a1t3 · a2t3 · a1t5 · a2t2 · a1t4 · a2t4 · a2t5 · a1t6 · a2t6
cannot be produced by any CAN trace of program !etop,
relative to any CAN plan-library that is directly mapped
from the above set of PRS plan-rules; e.g., the CAN body
et1 ; (et2 ‖ (et3 ; et5)); et4 ; et6 does not allow a2t5 to follow
a2t4 . 
5 Discussion
We proposed an operational semantics for a significant frag-
ment of the OpenPRS variant of PRS that accounts for (pos-
sibly nested) graph-based plan-bodies; language features
such as active preserves; and for adopting, suspending, re-
suming, and aborting such programs. We showed that our
semantics is sound, correctly accounts for the key interac-
tions between (nested) wait and preserve programs, and that
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plan-body graphs do not have a direct translation to plan-
bodies in a typical BDI-based agent programming language
(CAN).
Our work is closely related to that of Dastani et al. [4] on
the semantics of resuming, suspending, and aborting main-
tenance goals. They define complex goal types that include
achievement of goal formulas, maintenance goals and com-
plex temporal goals. All of these can be encoded as plan-
body graphs in PRS through a straightforward mapping.
Van Riemsdijk et al. [23] develop a modal logic for goal
representation and reasoning mechanisms for non-temporal
goals. While the goal types they consider could probably be
represented as PRS plan-body graphs, encoding the associ-
ated mechanisms for reasoning about goal conflicts is less
straightforward. Thangarajah et al. [21, 22] define an oper-
ational semantics for various types of goals, most of which
can be implemented using PRS plan-body graphs and pro-
grams. However, their maintenance goals include a con-
struct to proactively maintain a goal condition by anticipat-
ing whether it will fail. This specific capability of predicting
conditions in the future is lacking in our semantics.
Future work includes investigating whether an arbitrary
PRS plan-rule can be simulated by a set of CAN (or
AgentSpeak) plan-rules, and extending our semantics to add
more PRS features, e.g. meta-level reasoning and plan steps
that can overlap in execution.
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